

Zettel§1- §25

§1 ff There are philosophically interesting situations which are different, but which encourage a similar philosophical response, viz. we feel we have to open up a gap between what we say or do and what we think or mean or intend (in the various senses of those words). For example, the gap between

- knowing what we are going to say/whistle before we say/whistle it?
- saying something and saying something with feeling.
- words and their meanings.
- uttering a name and having someone in mind.

Sometimes Wittgenstein suggests that

- the gap is ok in particular cases §3;
- there is no gap: *'In most cases one might answer: "Nothing at all – I say..."* §4;
- the gap is closed
 - *subsequently* §8.
 - by context, *'the situation'* §9
 - by a 'narrative' §23
 - by the *'application of the talk'* §24.

Common philosophical positions Wittgenstein rejects:

- Meaning/thought etc. is something going on in tandem with overt behaviour §19.
- The connection between word and meaning is arbitrary or determined by our choice §5.
- Meaning etc. is a mental pointing §22.
- Meaning etc. is having a mental picture.
- There is *anything* that meaning something consists in §16.

In the case §22, my words did not settle the matter: 'I meant *him*, not *him*'. So I point. But pointing might not settle the matter either: 'I thought you were pointing at me?' So it seems that, as well as the physical pointing and the verbal clarification, there must be a mental pointing which is invisible to the pointee but unambiguous to the pointer.

'You in Mind: there are remarks that suggest that the resolution of some of these problems lies in the dialogical dynamics of language: *'That you meant that man by the word "you" in that letter consisted in this, that you were writing to him'* §16. See also the list of dialogical relations listed in §18.

§20 indicates where Wittgenstein is going to look for clarification of the meaning of meaning: *'the function of the word'*

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